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Abstract
In this paper we use the notion of distributable surplus, introduced by Allais (1943)
and Luenberger (1992), to evaluate the capacity of European countries to repay their
debts. In our analysis, we use Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models to
simulate diﬀerent policies that can be implemented to achieve debt sustainability. We
ﬁrst evaluate the quantity of distributable surplus that can be extracted from policies
aiming at increasing the quantity of labor and/or capital available in the economy. We
show that the results are very sensitive whether we consider deﬁcits before and after
the recent ﬁnancial and economic crises. Then, assuming that governments are able to
capture all the distributable surpluses, we compute the date at which they are able to
repay their debts. In particular, we ﬁnd that most EU countries, excepted Germany
and to lesser extent France and the UK, cannot achieve debt sustainability. We ﬁnally
discuss the usefulness of Eurobonds.
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1 Introduction
Over the years European governments have built huge public debts. With the recent eco-
nomic crisis the deﬁcits have reached unprecedented levels as it seemed necessary to support
the economy with budgetary measures (consider for example, the help to the French au-
tomobile industry). Table 1 shows the level of public deﬁcits and debts in 2005, 2009 and
2010, i.e. before and after the ﬁnancial and economic crises. We can see that deﬁcits have
worsen considerably for most countries except Germany and in particular for Greece, Spain,
Ireland and the UK. Consequently the public debt has dramatically increased in this period.
Table 1: Public deﬁcits and debts for several European countries
Public deficit / GDP Public debt / GDP Public deficit / GDP Public debt / GDP Public deficit / GDP Public debt / GDP
France 2.9 66.4 7.5 78.3 7.0 81.7
Germany 3.3 68.0 3.0 73.5 3.3 83.2
Greece 5.2 100.0 15.4 127.1 10.5 142.8
Ireland -1.6 27.4 14.3 65.6 32.4 96.2
Italy 4.3 105.9 5.4 116.1 4.6 119.0
Spain -1.0 43.0 11.1 53.3 9.2 60.1
UK 3.4 42.5 11.4 69.6 10.4 80.0
Source: Eurostat
2005 2009 2010
The question arises as to whether European governments will be able to repay their debt or
whether they will have to resort to inﬂationary measures, or explicit default. Governments
need the cooperation of taxpayers to be able to levy enough taxes to repay their debts.
However, if taxes are too high, people could modify their behavior in the labor market by
reducing labor supply and in the capital market by transferring capital oﬀshore, implying
that the State will not be able to levy enough taxes. So, it is not possible as often advocated
in the popular press, to simply take money from the relatively wealthy.
The idea of our paper is that only surpluses can be taxed away by the governments. Surplus
can be loosely deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the maximum price a buyer is ready to pay
and the minimum price a seller is ready to accept for any trade. In the absence of state
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intervention, the surplus is shared by the buyer and the seller according to their bargaining
power. The government can potentially take all the surplus in the transaction but not more
as the buyer and/or the seller would get less then their reservation price and would then
withdraw from the trade. Because of its excessive greediness, the state would dry out the
source of income on which it draws.
The surplus indicates the maximum amount that is taxable by the State. We will assume
here that governments are able to tax all surpluses even if, in practice, the eﬀective amount
that can be extracted depends on the available ﬁscal tools as well as the information avail-
able to the State. The speciﬁc notion of surplus that is used in our paper is that of the
distributable surplus proposed by Allais (1943, 1981) or, equivalently, of the beneﬁt function
proposed by Luenberger (1992, 1995). In particular, Allais and Luenberger deﬁne surplus
as the maximum quantity of a reference good that can be taken away from a consumer with
a given level of utility.
Several methods permit the evaluation of distributable surplus. For example, methods
based on contingent evaluation are particularly well suited for experimental microeconomic
analysis. The method we follow in our paper is based on the use of Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models as they seem more suitable for macroeconomic analysis. How-
ever, independently of the method used to compute the distributable surplus, it represents
the upper limit of taxable output.
The aim of our paper is to use the concept of distributable surplus to evaluate how much
surplus can be extracted from European economies in order to investigate whether European
public debts are sustainable. Given that the distributable surplus represents the maximum
taxable output that governments can extract from their respective taxpayers, we are able
to compute the maximum level of debt that governments can aﬀord and to determine the
date at which governments are able to repay their debts. The result of our analysis is that
most EU countries, excepted Germany and to lesser extent France and the UK, cannot
achieve debt sustainability.
It is important to note that the methodology used in our paper diﬀers from that of previous
studies. Public debt sustainability has been empirically tested by assuming that past be-
havior of ﬁscal policies remains constant. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) propose a framework
for analyzing whether governments can run a Ponzi scheme or not and ﬁnd sustainability
of US ﬁscal policy. A number of studies have tested the sustainability of public deﬁcits
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by analyzing the stationarity and the cointegration properties of total public expenditures
and revenues as ratios of GDP. Concerning European countries, Santos Bravo and Silvestre
(2002), assuming that cointegration of expenditures and revenues is a suﬃcient condition for
sustainability, ﬁnd sustainable ﬁscal policies in Germany, the UK, Austria, France and the
Netherlands, but not in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Finland. Greiner
et al. (2007), ﬁnd that ﬁscal policies in some European countries are sustainable follow-
ing the approach developed by Bohn (1995, 1998) implying that the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government holds in the case in which the public debt to GDP ratio is a
mean-reverting process.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we deﬁne distributable sur-
plus through the Allais (1943) and Luenberger (1992) beneﬁt function and Boiteux' (1951)
distributable income function. Then we investigate whether European countries have gener-
ated suﬃcient surplus during the period 2005-2009 to cover their public deﬁcits. In section
4, we analyze the sustainability of European public debts. We then present CGE models for
seven European countries and evaluate, using diﬀerent ﬁscal rules, whether various policies
are able to generate suﬃcient surplus. We conclude in the last section.
2 The distributable surplus
Let an economy be composed by two consumers j = 1, 2 and two goods i = 1, 2. They have
the following utility function Uj(xj) = Uj(x
1
j , x
2
j ) =
∏
i(x
i
j)
αij with α1j + α
2
j = 1 and they
are endowed with the bundle of goods ωj = {ω1j , ω2j }.
Let g ∈ <2+ be a reference bundle of goods, arbitrarily deﬁned. Let u be a reference utility
level which represents the minimum utility level that is acceptable by the individual. We
can deﬁne the distributable surplus relative to the reference utility u and the bundle of
good x as :
{
bj(xj , uj) = maxβ β
s.t. uj(xj − βg) ≥ uj
(1)
In words, the distributable surplus represents the maximum number of units of bundle g
that the consumer j is ready to give up to obtain bundle xj when his initial utility level
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is uj . If g is a unit of gold, then bj(xj , uj) can be interpreted as the maximum price that
the agent will agree to pay in order to acquire xj knowing that he has a utility level of uj .
Hence, bj(xj , uj) can be interpreted as the reservation price of xj for individual j as gold
can be taken as the numéraire.
In the case of the above Cobb-Douglas utility function, for g = (1, 0), the distributable
function is given by :
bj(x, u) = x
2
j −
(
uj
(x1j )
α1j
) 1
α2
j
Alternatively, it is possible to use Boiteux' surplus function to evaluate total distributable
surplus in the economy. Boiteux' (1951) and Courtault et al. (2008) present an analogue
of the beneﬁt function in the dual space of price-income pairs, ranked with the agent's
indirect utility functions vj . Agent j's Boiteux' surplus at utility level uj , relative to the
price-income pair (p, Rj), is deﬁned by:
d(p, Rj , uj) = min
d
d s.t. vj(p, Rj + d) ≥ uj (2)
The Boiteux' distributable income function d(p, Rj , uj) measures the income that must be
given to an individual to move from a reference utility level uj to an environment (p, Rj)
which represents the new allocation. The Boiteux's distributable income function, being
deﬁned in terms of income, is more intuitive than the beneﬁt function which is deﬁned in
terms of an arbitrary bundle of goods. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function,
the distributable income function is given by :
d(p, Rj , uj) = Rj − uj ·
∏
i
(
pi
αij
)αij
In the Appendix we determine the distributable surplus in a 2x2 pure exchange economy.
In particular, we compute the equilibrium of this economy and we deduce the total maximal
distributable surplus using both measures that can be extracted from this economy. This
distributable surplus, that is also expressed as a percentage of GDP, is computed using
as reference utility level for each consumer the utility of his initial endowment, as this
5
represents the minimum utility level that an individual can achieve if he chooses not to
trade.
3 CGE model for several European countries
In this section we use CGE models in order to evaluate the distributable surplus that
European governments can extract from their taxpayers. The analysis is carried out by
using CGE models for seven countries: France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
It is important to note that computable general equilibrium models are built in such a
way that observed situation represents the equilibrium of the economy. Hence, the initial
allocation in CGE models is already Pareto-optimal as ﬁrst welfare theorem is always ver-
iﬁed in the absence of externalities and market frictions. However, ﬁscal policies or other
macroeconomic shocks can change the equilibrium of the economy. So, for each shock, we
are able to compute the distributable surplus which can be generated from this shock. This
will give us an idea as to which policy can be implemented to generate maximum possible
surplus.
The structure of the model we used in our paper is fairly standard, along the lines of
Devarajan and Lewis (1990) and Shoven and Whalley (1992). CGE models are widely used
to analyze the eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks and policies in a coherent framework that
takes into account the interrelations existing among economic agents (ﬁrms, households,
government, and the rest of the world).
3.1 Description of the CGE models
In this paper, we use a CGE model for each of the seven countries considered. Each CGE
model is multisectoral (we consider 16 sectors) and considers a representative household.
The models are built by using 2005 input-ouput data provided by OECD and data con-
cerning national accounts. In order to take into account the eﬀects of the recent crisis on
the possibility of surplus extraction, we use 2009 data from national accounts and we use
the same structure for input-output.
In each sector, production depends on the quantity used of primary factors (labor and
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capital) and of intermediate goods. We use a two-stage CES production function where in
the ﬁrst stage production depends on primary factors and total intermediate good, and in
the second stage the total intermediate good depends on the intermediate goods produced by
the other sectors. The production is sold in the domestic market or exported, where exports
depend on the relative price, i.e. the ratio between the foreign price and the domestic price.
The production that is sold in the domestic market and the imports constitute a composite
good that is sold in the market to the ﬁrms (as intermediate goods), the households, the
government, or used as investment good. The production that is sold in the domestic
market and the imports are assumed to be imperfect substitutes (Armington assumption).
Concerning the households, the disposable income is given by the diﬀerence between the
revenues (labor and capital incomes, transfers from the government and interests on the
public debt) and direct taxation. An exogenous and constant fraction of the disposable
income is saved and the complementary fraction is consumed. Households have CES pref-
erences that allow them to determine the optimal quantity of goods demanded for each
sector.
Concerning the budget constraint of the government, the diﬀerence between the total ex-
penditure (for goods demanded, transfers to households and interests on the public debt)
and revenues (direct and indirect taxation) determines the government deﬁcit. We discuss
the ﬁscal rule in the next section.
The equilibrium of the balance of payments is guaranteed by capital inﬂows or outﬂows
that are endogenously determined by the net exports. This implies that the exchange rate
is ﬁxed exogenously. Another possibility is to ﬁx the capital inﬂows and determine the
exchange rate endogenously in order to equilibrate the balance of payments. This is the
case for the United Kingdom.
We use the neoclassical macro-closure implying that investments are determined by aggre-
gate savings, i.e private and public savings and international capital ﬂows.
All markets clear. For each sector, the domestic price adjusts in order to equalize the
quantity produced and demanded (domestic and foreign). The real wage adjusts in order
to equalize the total labor demanded by the sectors and the (exogenous) labor supplied
by the households and the real capital remuneration adjusts in order to equalize the total
capital demanded by the sectors and the (exogenous) capital supplied by the households.
The models are solved by considering the producer price index as the numeraire.
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3.2 Fiscal rules
The government budget constrain can be written as:
Def = G+ Γ + r ·B −
(∑
i
τV Ai · V Ai +
∑
i
τprodi · Yi + τY · Y
)
(3)
where G represents the total government expenditure for goods and services, Γ the transfers
to families, r ·B the interests paid on the public debt, τV Ai the VAT rate diﬀerentiated by
sector i, τprodi the tax rate on products, τY the income tax rate. The government can set
any of the following variables (except one): the deﬁcit, the total expenditure, transfers to
households, the income tax rate, the VAT rates and the tax rates on products. We will not
consider as instruments the transfers, the VAT rates and the tax rates on products and we
consider to following ﬁve ﬁscal rules.
In the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule, the government deﬁcit and the income tax rate are assumed to
be exogenous and ﬁxed at the initial level (Def = Def0 and τY = τY0), and the total
government expenditure (G) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint.
In the second ﬁscal rule, the government deﬁcit is assumed to be exogenous and ﬁxed at the
initial level (Def = Def0), the total government expenditure per worker is kept constant
(GL = α) and the income tax rate (τY ) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the
budget constraint.
In the third ﬁscal rule, the government deﬁcit is determined such that the ratio between
the deﬁcit and GDP remains constant ( DefGDP = β), the income tax rate is assumed to be
exogenous (τY = τY0) and the total government expenditure (G) is endogenously determined
in order to satisfy the budget constraint.
In the fourth ﬁscal rule, the government deﬁcit is determined such that the ratio between
the deﬁcit and GDP remains constant ( DefGDP = β), the total government expenditure is
kept constant (G = G0) and the income tax rate (τY ) is endogenously determined in order
to satisfy the budget constraint.
In the ﬁfth ﬁscal rule, the total government expenditure and the income tax rate are exoge-
nous (G = G0 and τY = τY0) and the government deﬁcit (Def) is endogenously determined
8
in order to satisfy the budget constraint.
3.3 Reference bundle
In our analysis we consider two reference bundles: in the ﬁrst case we consider the equilib-
rium consumption bundle of the representative household. In the second case, we will use
instead the distributable income as the reference unit.
Two choices are possible: either we ﬁx the reservation utility at the 2005 utility level, or at
2009 utility level. In the ﬁrst case we are able to answer whether there was enough surplus
in the economy to cover the 2009 deﬁcit, or whether it would have been necessary to cut
spending. We will also be able to compute the reduction of well-being necessary to generate
suﬃcient surplus in the case in which diminution of spending is not politically feasible. In
the second case, one considers implicitly that no reduction of well-being is acceptable by
the community, hence we consider whether the government is able to generate surplus
through the introduction of a policy aiming at increasing the quantity of labor and/or
capital available in the economy.1
4 Have European economies generated suﬃcient surpluses?
We examine now whether the economies have generated suﬃcient surpluses in the period
2005-2009 to cover the public deﬁcits during the same period. Surpluses are suﬃcient when
the quantity of surplus generated by each economy is greater or equal than actual deﬁcit.
In order to compute the surplus it is necessary to ﬁx a reservation utility level deﬁned as
the minimum utility level that households will accept. We assume that the reference utility
level is the level in 2005 i.e. before the crisis.
Table 2 shows that the surplus generated between 2005 and 2009 was not suﬃcient to cover
the 2009 deﬁcit for Greece, Ireland and Spain. For these countries in order to generate
a surplus equal to the 2009 deﬁcit, it would be necessary to reduce the initial well-being
(measured by the disposable income devoted to consumption) by 11% in Greece, 13% in
Ireland and Spain, and 9% in the UK. Indeed to sustain such level of deﬁcit, Ireland for
1This kind of policy is the only possible in order to increase GDP in a CGE model that is not demand-
driven.
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example, would have to accept a level of disposable income lower than 13% than the 2005
level, corresponding to the 2002 level. This table clearly shows that some countries (Ireland,
Spain, the UK, and more particularly Greece) have increased their level of consumption be-
tween 2005 and 2009 even if they should have reduced it drastically. France has increased
its consumption over and above the feasible level, while Italy has slightly decreased con-
sumption as necessary. In contrast, Germany has increased consumption well below what
they could have done.
Each government could have extracted more surplus each year instead of running deﬁcits.
But they didn't. Hence, they have to repay past deﬁcits with current surplus. Here, we
consider the case whether countries are able to repay past deﬁcits (cumulated in the period
2005-2009) with the 2009 surplus. The only country that could have done that is Germany
and could maintain the 2003 well-being level. All the other countries should accept a strong
reduction in their well-being, comparable to their early 1990 level.
Table 2: Analysis of the capacity of EU countries to cover public deﬁcits
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Spain Uk
Surplus 2009 (reference utility 2005) /  GDP (2009) 8.0% 7.1% 7.6% 8.9% 5.1% 4.0% 5.8%
Deficit (2009)  /  GDP (2009) 7.5% 3.0% 15.4% 14.3% 5.4% 11.1% 11.4%
% actual variation of consumption wrt 2005 5.1% 1.8% 9.2% 3.1% -0.3% 2.4% 1.1%
% variation of consumption wrt 2005 compatible with budget equilibrium 1.2% 8.2% -11.8% -13.3% -0.3% -13.4% -9.2%
Year corresponding to the reference utility necessary to achieve budget equilibrium 2005-2006 > 2010 2002 2002 2005 2001 2001
Cumulate deficits 2005-2009  /  GDP (2009) 18.7% 7.5% 42.5% 17.0% 17.3% 10.4% 25.2%
% variation of consumption wrt 2005 compatible with budget equilibrium -21.2% -0.4% -53.1% -13.3% -22.8% -12.4% -33.1%
Year corresponding to the reference utility necessary to achieve budget equilibrium 1994 2003 < 1980 2002 1998 2001 1993
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5 Simulation results of diﬀerent macroeconomic shocks on
distributable surpluses
In this section we consider the case in which people do not accept any reduction of their well-
being and we analyze the policies that government could implement in order to generate
suﬃcient surplus. Indeed, we are entitled to consider that the reference utility level of
agents is equal to the utility level that they achieved in the absence of the policies under
consideration. In fact, the government is perfectly free to introduce or not these policies
and, as a consequence, it can capture all the surpluses that can be generated by these
policies.
The analysis is carried out by using the CGE models. The initial equilibrium used to
calibrate our models gives us the reference utility level. Starting from this level, a macroe-
conomic shock or policy will move the economy out of the initial equilibrium and will allow
us to compute the surplus generated by such a shock.
We consider three types of shocks under diﬀerent ﬁscal rules: a shock on the labor supply
and on the capital supply and on both. These shocks may be interpreted as government
policies. An increase in the labor supply may be induced, for example, by an immigration
policy, an increase in the retirement age, or an increase in the legal number of work hours
per week. An increase in capital supply may be induced, for example, by policies stimulating
foreign investments or the repatriation of national capitals invested abroad. Some of the
ﬁscal rules considered in our simulations permits to consider the cost of these policies. For
example, an immigration policy requires an increase in expenditures (health, education,
infrastructures) which is explicitly taken into account by the second ﬁscal rule in which per
capita public expenditure is kept constant.
In our analysis, we consider two distinct periods, before and after the 2009 economic crisis.
This allows us to reach a more balanced view of the possibility to generate distributable
surplus, since both periods of expansion and depression tend to give a biased evaluation of
the eﬀect of government policies.
5.1 Before the crisis
The objective of our simulations is to compute the increase in (i) labor supply, or (ii) capital
supply, or (iii) both labor and capital supply, that is necessary to generate a surplus suﬃcient
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to cover the public deﬁcit. In what follows, we deﬁne the "eﬃciency" of a production factor
as the capacity of this factor to generate such a surplus. The higher is the necessary increase
in a factor, the lower is the eﬃciency of this factor.
The simulations are run only for the ﬁve countries that display a deﬁcit (Greece, France,
Germany, Italy, UK), and not for the two countries that have a surplus in 2005 (Ireland
and Spain). For each country and the ﬁve ﬁscal rules, we show in Table 3 the percentage
variation of production factors necessary to generate a surplus equal to the budget deﬁcit.
First of all, the results shows that countries can be separated in two groups: France,
Germany and UK on one side, and Greece and Italy on the other side. The diﬀerence
between the two groups is related to the share of labor incomes in total GDP that is quite
low in the second group (lower that 50%). The two groups are also diﬀerent in terms of
public deﬁcits over GDP in 2005: countries in the ﬁrst group have deﬁcits close to the level
ﬁxed by the Maastricht rule, while the countries in the second group have a much higher
deﬁcit.
Table 3: Percentage increase in factor supply necessary to cover the 2005 deﬁcits
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
L 7.4% 10.9% 7.7% 10.9% 11.4% 9.7%
K 16.6% 12.5% 18.2% 12.6% 12.2% 14.4%
L and K 4.8% 5.4% 5.0% 5.4% 5.4% 5.2%
L 9.3% 13.4% 9.8% 13.5% 14.5% 12.1%
K 16.3% 12.8% 17.8% 13.0% 12.4% 14.5%
L and K 5.5% 6.0% 5.9% 6.0% 6.1% 5.9%
L 7.6% 9.0% 7.9% 9.0% 9.0% 8.5%
K 19.4% 15.7% 21.8% 15.7% 15.6% 17.6%
L and K 5.1% 5.3% 5.4% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3%
L 14.8% 22.9% 15.6% 23.0% 23.5% 20.0%
K 16.9% 13.2% 19.3% 13.3% 13.1% 15.2%
L and K 7.2% 7.5% 7.8% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5%
L 14.8% 23.6% 15.5% 23.2% 21.7% 19.8%
K 14.3% 12.2% 16.2% 12.0% 12.5% 13.4%
L and K 6.7% 7.2% 7.3% 7.2% 7.2% 7.1%
France
Germany
Italy
Greece
UK
By considering the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule, in which the government deﬁcit and the income tax
rate are exogenous while the public expenditure is determined by the government budget
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constraint, we can see that, for countries in the ﬁrst group, it is necessary to increase
capital supply by a much larger amount than labor supply while, for Greece and Italy, the
diﬀerence between the necessary increase in labor and capital supply is much lower. It is
interesting to compare Germany and the UK as they have almost identical deﬁcit/GDP
ratio. We can note that in order to generate a surplus equal to the deﬁcit, the UK has to
increase labor supply by a smaller amount than Germany, but needs a greater increase in
capital supply. Overall, the eﬃciency is greater in the UK, in the sense that UK has to
increase both factors by 5.1% vs. 5.5% for Germany. France needs to increase both factors
by only 4.8% thanks to the lower deﬁcit/GDP ratio with respect to Germany and the UK.
Interestingly, whereas Greece has a greater deﬁcit than Italy, it is necessary to increase
labor and capital supply by a lower amount (6.7% versus 7.2% for Italy).
With the second ﬁscal rule the eﬃciency of the increase in labor supply is much smaller for
each country than in the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule. However, the necessary increase in capital supply
is much smaller than in the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule. The results are explained by the fact that with
this rule, per worker government expenditure is kept constant. This is justiﬁed by the fact
that the increase in labor supply can be realized by an immigration policy. Consequently,
an increase in labor supply produces an increase in public spending which has a negative
inﬂuence on the government ﬁnances. The overall eﬃciency of the increase in both factors
is lower than in the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule. Indeed, the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule is more overall eﬃcient
than any other ﬁscal rules. If we look at labor supply eﬃciency, we can see that the most
eﬃcient ﬁscal rule is the ﬁrst one, whereas in terms of capital supply eﬃciency, the most
eﬃcient ﬁscal rule is the fourth.
The results obtained with the third ﬁscal rule are very similar to the ones obtained with the
ﬁrst ﬁscal rule, although the overall eﬃciency of labor and capital supply is greater with
respect to the ﬁrst ﬁscal rule.
5.2 After the crisis
After the crisis, the increase in only one production factor that would be necessary to
generate a suﬃcient surplus to cover the 2009 deﬁcit is too large to be considered as feasible.
So, instead, we consider an increase in both factors. Table 4 show that only Germany
appears to have maintained its capacity to generate enough surplus to cover the deﬁcit,
whereas all the other countries have seen their situation drastically deteriorated. Indeed
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simple average across ﬁscal rules shows that for Germany an increase of 5.6% of both labor
and capital is suﬃcient to generate a surplus equal to the deﬁcit, whereas it was 5.9% before
the crisis. For all the other countries the percentage shock over both labor and capital is
much higher after the crisis, with a maximum average of 41.2% for Ireland. We can rank
the countries by increasing order of diﬃculty of getting out of the budget deﬁcit dilemma:
Germany 5.6%, Italy with 9.9%, France with 15%, the UK with 22.7%, Spain with 23.5%,
Greece with 24.6% and Ireland with 41.2%.
Table 4: Percentage increase in both factors necessary to cover the 2009 deﬁcits
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Germany 6.2% 5.0% 6.6% 5.1% 4.9% 5.6%
Italy 11.0% 8.7% 12.6% 8.8% 8.5% 9.9%
France 15.4% 13.8% 18.3% 14.1% 13.6% 15.0%
UK 23.5% 19.5% 31.3% 19.8% 19.2% 22.7%
Spain 23.2% 20.9% 30.9% 22.0% 20.3% 23.5%
Greece 21.3% 24.6% 27.6% 24.7% 24.7% 24.6%
Ireland 36.8% 35.5% 58.9% 39.7% 35.0% 41.2%
The media have particularly stressed the diﬃculty for Greece to repay its debt whereas its
situation is not much worse than that of Spain and, surprisingly, the UK. The situation of
Ireland seems catastrophic. This result is only partly explained by the value of the deﬁcits
that are diﬀerent in each country. The deﬁcit of Greece is more important that of Ireland.
However the percentage increase in production factors to cover the deﬁcit is smaller.
The third ﬁscal rule seems to be the worst rule in order to generate a surplus suﬃcient to
cover the deﬁcit. For all countries, except Greece, the best ﬁscal rule is the ﬁfth, i.e. the
case in which public deﬁcits are endogenous. It would seem that a Maastricht rule type is
bad during crisis whereas it seems better to adopt a more permissive budgetary policy.
5.3 Equal deﬁcit
Here we make the assumption that the public deﬁcit, for each country, respects the Maas-
tricht criterium, i.e. is equal to 3% of GDP. Table 5 shows that each European country is
able to generate suﬃcient surpluses. Surprisingly, Greece is now in a better position with
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respect to the other countries, while Ireland is again in the worst position. Except for the
UK, where the best ﬁscal rule is now the second or the fourth, the ordering of the ﬁscal
rules for the other countries has not changed.
Table 5: Percentage increase in both factors necessary to cover a deﬁcit equal to 3% of GDP
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
France 5.8% 5.2% 6.2% 5.2% 5.1% 5.5%
Spain 5.7% 5.0% 6.0% 5.1% 5.0% 5.4%
Germany 6.1% 5.0% 6.5% 5.0% 4.9% 5.5%
Ireland 6.7% 6.3% 7.2% 6.4% 6.3% 6.6%
Italy 6.1% 4.8% 6.5% 4.8% 4.7% 5.4%
Greece 3.5% 4.0% 3.7% 4.0% 3.9% 3.8%
UK 5.7% 4.6% 6.0% 4.6% 4.7% 5.1%
6 Sustainability of public debts
In this section we compute for each country the year in which the actual public debt plus
the present value of future public deﬁcits are compensated by the present value of future
distributable surpluses. Public debt is deﬁned as sustainable only in the case in which the
date computed exists.
In our analysis we make the following assumptions: for each country, the ratio of public
deﬁcit with respect to GDP decreases linearly over time towards zero between 2012 and
2020; real GDP and distributable surpluses grow at the constant rate of 1.5%.
In the computation of the present values, we consider four diﬀerent interest rates. The ﬁrst
one is the ten-year government bond rate observed on November 9 2011.2 This interest
rate is relevant in the case in which all the debt has to be renewed at that date. However,
if the time to maturity of the debt is not immediate, this interest rate is not relevant.
This is why, secondly, we consider the average ten-year government bond rate observed
in 2011 and, thirdly, the current yield interest rate computed as the ratio between actual
interests payments and the actual public debt. Finally, we consider the average ten-year
2This date has been chosen in our analysis as it is one of the worst period in the history of the Euro
zone in terms of high interest rates for most of highly indebted countries (Italy, Spain and Greece).
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government bond rate observed in the Euro zone weighted by the size of public debts. This
rate is interesting because it could approximate the rate on Euro bonds in the case in which
European governments decide to introduce this kind of instrument to ﬁnance the overall
European debt.
Table 6 shows that, in any interest rate scenario, only France, Germany and the UK are
able to repay the current public debt using future surpluses generated by their economies.
This is precisely the case of the ﬁrst scenario in which all the other countries are not able
to repay their debts within a ﬁnite horizon. If we consider the average 2011 interest bond
rate (second scenario) debt is not sustainable for Greece and Ireland, while for Italy and
Spain the date computed is so remote that we can have doubts on the sustainability of
their debts. If we consider the current yield and the Euro bond scenarios (third and fourth
scenarios) the debt is sustainable for all countries. However, the third scenario is not very
realistic as ﬁnancial markets are not willing anymore to lend to most European countries
on the basis of past interest rates at which the debt was contracted. It is interesting to note
that in the Euro bond scenario the date computed is delayed, with respect to the second
scenario, only for France and Germany by only two years. However, even this scenario is
not very realistic since for Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain the date is very remote implying
a strong uncertainty concerning the validity of our hypotheses over such a long period.
Table 6: Analysis of the sustainability of public debts
November 09/2011 (1) Average 2011 (2) Current yield (3) Euro average (4)
Interest rate 3.16% 3.32% 2.76% 4.66%
Year 2026 2026 2025 2028
Interest rate 1.81% 2.74% 3.52% 4.66%
Year 2021 2023 2023 2025
Interest rate 30.69% 16.66% 4.20% 4.66%
Year never never 2049 2055
Interest rate 8.24% 9.87% 2.90% 4.66%
Year never never 2043 2061
Interest rate 6.76% 5.14% 3.60% 4.66%
Year never 2096 2049 2067
Interest rate 5.71% 5.40% 2.80% 4.66%
Year never 2136 2043 2064
Interest rate 2.35% 3.13% 2.51%
Year 2034 2037 2035
Source: Ecowin (November 2011)
(1) Bond yield on November 9 2011
(2) Average bond yield in 2011
(3) Interests / Public debt
(4) Average bond yield in 2011 weighted by the size of public debts
UK
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Spain
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we use the concept of distributable surplus proposed by Allais (1943) and
Luenberger (1992) to investigate about (i) the capacity of European governments to generate
suﬃcient surpluses to cover public deﬁcits and (ii) the sustainability of public debts.
After showing that European governments have not generated suﬃcient surplus with their
economic policies implemented over the recent period (2005-2009), we investigate whether a
policy aiming at increasing both labor and capital supply could be suﬃcient to cover actual
deﬁcits. Using CGE models for several European countries, we show that public deﬁcits
observed before the crisis could be covered by a relatively small increase in labor and capital
supply of about 5%. However, in order to cover the 2009 public deﬁcits would require for
all countries, except Germany, a much larger increase in both production factors. Given
that current public spending cannot be ﬁnanced by taxing the distributable surplus as the
level of the increase in labor and capital necessary to achieve the budget equilibrium is not
realistic, European governments will have to reduce their public spending, at the most, to
the level observed before the crisis.
Concerning the sustainability of public debts in the Euro zone, that is necessary for the
preservation of the Euro system, we found that the best solution is the introduction of Euro
bonds. However, even this scenario is not very realistic since for Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Spain the date at which the debt is completely repaid is so remote that it raises doubts
on the eﬃciency of this policy. In any case, this policy would imply the strict control of
public expenditures of the diﬀerent European countries by European institutions in order
to maintain the debt under control.
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Appendix 1: An illustration with a 2x2 pure exchange economy
Here, we present numerical simulations within a 2x2 pure exchange economy in which the economy
is supposed to be composed by two consumers j = 1, 2 and two goods i = 1, 2. They have the
following utility function Uj(xj) = Uj(x
1
j , x
2
j ) =
∏
i(x
i
j)
αij with α1j + α
2
j = 1 and they are endowed
with the bundle of goods ωj = {ω1j , ω2j }. We also assume that there exists one unit of each type of
good.
The following tables present, for a given initial distribution of endowments and for a speciﬁc refer-
ence bundle, the eﬀect of varying elasticities of the Cobb-Douglas utility function with respect to
each good and the eﬀect of the initial distribution of endowments, on the value of the distributable
surplus expressed as the percentage of the total equilibrium value of income.
The ﬁrst set of tables considers as reference bundle g = (0, 1).
 
 
  ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 8.64% 2.91% 0.00%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.50% 0.00% 2.66%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 2.22% 6.89% 
0.50 20.04% 12.50% 2.97%  0.50 10.99% 3.33% 0.00%  0.50 2.45% 0.00% 2.46% 
0.75 30.58% 23.99% 9.93%  0.75 21.26% 11.24% 2.48%  0.75 8.50% 2.39% 0.00% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.37% 0.00% 2.74%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 3.21% 11.09%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.37% 9.57% 17.99% 
0.50 9.57% 3.33% 0.00%  0.50 3.21% 0.00% 3.29%  0.50 0.00% 3.33% 11.48% 
0.75 17.99% 11.48% 2.61%  0.75 11.09% 3.29% 0.00%  0.75 2.74% 0.00% 2.61% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 2.45% 8.50%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.50% 10.99% 21.26%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 8.64% 20.04% 30.58% 
0.50 2.22% 0.00% 2.39%  0.50 0.00% 3.33% 11.24%  0.50 2.91% 12.50% 23.99% 
0.75 6.89% 2.46% 0.00%  0.75 2.66% 0.00% 2.48%  0.75 0.00% 2.97% 9.93% 
 
The second set of tables considers as reference bundle g = (1, 0).
 
 
  ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 8.64% 2.91% 0.00%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.50% 0.00% 2.66%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 2.22% 6.89% 
0.50 20.04% 12.50% 2.97%  0.50 10.99% 3.33% 0.00%  0.50 2.45% 0.00% 2.46% 
0.75 30.58% 23.99% 9.93%  0.75 21.26% 11.24% 2.48%  0.75 8.50% 2.39% 0.00% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.37% 0.00% 2.74%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 3.21% 11.09%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.37% 9.57% 17.99% 
0.50 9.57% 3.33% 0.00%  0.50 3.21% 0.00% 3.29%  0.50 0.00% 3.33% 11.48% 
0.75 17.99% 11.48% 2.61%  0.75 11.09% 3.29% 0.00%  0.75 2.74% 0.00% 2.61% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 2.45% 8.50%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.50% 10.99% 21.26%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 8.64% 20.04% 30.58% 
0.50 2.22% 0.00% 2.39%  0.50 0.00% 3.33% 11.24%  0.50 2.91% 12.50% 23.99% 
0.75 6.89% 2.46% 0.00%  0.75 2.66% 0.00% 2.48%  0.75 0.00% 2.97% 9.93% 
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In the last set of tables we compute the Boiteux' distributable income surplus.
 
 
  ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ    ߙଵଵ
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
 ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.25 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
 
0.25 0.50 0.75 
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 26.27% 13.40% 3.00%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.62% 0.00% 2.78%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 2.41% 8.91% 
0.50 12.21% 3.41% 0.00%  0.50 12.21% 3.41% 0.00%  0.50 2.53% 0.00% 2.53% 
0.75 42.26% 26.27% 10.11%  0.75 24.47% 11.65% 2.50%  0.75 8.91% 2.41% 0.00% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.50 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 11.65% 3.41% 0.00%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 0.00% 3.33% 12.26%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.50% 11.65% 24.47% 
0.50 3.33% 0.00% 3.33%  0.50 3.33% 0.00% 3.33%  0.50 0.00% 3.41% 12.21% 
0.75 24.47% 12.21% 2.62%  0.75 12.26% 3.33% 0.00%  0.75 2.78% 0.00% 2.62% 
                 
߱ଵ
ଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.75 
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.50
     ߱ଵଵ ൌ 0.75 
߱ଵ
ଶ ൌ 0.25
    
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.41% 0.00% 2.41%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 2.62% 12.21% 24.47%  
ߙଶ
ଵ 
0.25 10.11% 26.27% 42.26% 
0.50 0.00% 3.41% 11.65%  0.50 0.00% 3.41% 11.65%  0.50 3.00% 13.40% 26.27% 
0.75 8.91% 2.53% 0.00%  0.75 2.78% 0.00% 2.50%  0.75 0.00% 3.00% 10.11% 
 
 
Firstly, we can see that the results are not aﬀected by the choice of the reference bundle. Indeed,
results are perfectly symmetrical when the reference bundle is g = (0, 1) instead of g = (1, 0). In
addition, when we use income as the numéraire, the results are qualitatively similar. It is possible
to note that when the elasticity with respect to one good is exactly equal to the initial endowment
in that good for any agent, then the distributable surplus is nil however measured as the initial
distribution is already Pareto-optimal (see for example Bewley, 2007, chapter 3). Moreover, the
results show that the farther is the initial distribution from the Pareto-optimal allocation, the
greater is the value of the distributable surplus that can be taxed by the government. Indeed,
in the particular case where goods are equally distributed among consumers and preferences are
identical, the distributable surplus is nil as the initial distribution is already Pareto-optimal, hence
there is no incentives to trade.
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